Elephant in the Room (англ.) – идиоматическое выражение, используемое для характеристики чего-то настолько бросающегося в глаза, что не заметить его сложно, однако наблюдатели либо и в самом деле не видят проблемы, либо по каким-то причинам предпочитают не обращать на нее внимания. Ср. с выражением “Слона-то я и не приметил”. – Прим. ред.
Мои исследования личного пространства и сложных движений изложены в двух книгах. M. S. A. Graziano, The Intelligent Movement Machine (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008); M. S. A. Graziano, The Spaces between Us: A Story of Neuroscience, Evolution, and Human Nature (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
Следующие ссылки дают комплексное представление об этой теории. Другие, более технические или сосредоточенные на экспериментальных данных работы здесь не приводятся. M. S. A. Graziano and S. Kastner, “Human Consciousness and Its Relationship to Social Neuroscience: A Novel Hypothesis,” Cognitive Neuroscience 2 (2011): 98–113; M. S. A. Graziano, Consciousness and the Social Brain (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013); T. W. Webb and M. S. A. Graziano, “The Attention Schema Theory: A Mechanistic Account of Subjective Awareness,” Frontiers in Psychology 6 (2015): article 500.
Невозможно воздать здесь должное всем новым работам, посвященным механистическому, недуалистическому подходу к сознанию. Я привожу лишь несколько примеров и прошу прощения у множества блестящих авторов, которых не упоминаю. S. J. Blackmore, “Consciousness In Meme Machines,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (2003): 19–30; P. S. Churchland, Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Selves (New York: W. W. Norton, 2013); F. Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul (New York: Scribner, 1995); S. Dehaene, Consciousness and the Brain (New York: Viking Press, 2014); D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Back Bay Books, 1991); K. Frankish, “Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (2016): 11–39; R. J. Gennaro, Consciousness and Self Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher Order Thought Theory of Consciousness (Philadelphia: John Benjamin’s Publishing, 1996); O. Holland and R. Goodman, “Robots with Internal Models: A Route to Machine Consciousness?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (2003): 77–109; T. Metzinger, The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self (New York: Basic Books, 2009).
D. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1995): 200–219.
Более ранний и весьма прозорливый подход к сознанию, делающий акцент на внутренних моделях, содержится в работе: O. Holland and R. Goodman, “Robots with Internal Models: A Route to Machine Consciousness?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (2003): 77–109.
G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).
J. Joyce, Ulysses (Paris: Sylvia Beach, 1922). Русский перевод: Джойс Д. Улисс / Пер. с англ. В. Хинкиса и С. Хоружего; коммент. С. Хоружего. – М.: Республика, 1993.
D. Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); T. Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 83 (1974): 435–50; J. R. Searle, “Consciousness,” Annual Review of Neuroscience 23 (2000): 557–78.
R. A. Koene, “Scope and Resolution in Neural Prosthetics and Special Concerns for the Emulation of a Whole Brain,” Journal of Geoethical Nanotechnology 1 (2006): 21–29; R. Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (New York: Penguin Books, 2006); H. Markram, E. Muller, S. Ramaswamy, M. W. Reimann, M. Abdellah, C. A. Sanchez, A. Ailamaki, et al., “Reconstruction and Simulation of Neocortical Microcircuitry,” Cell 163 (2015): 456–92; A. Sandberg and N. Bostrom, “Whole Brain Emulation: A Roadmap,” Technical Report #2008–3, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, 2008.
И другие авторы убедительно описывали возможный ход эволюции сознания, включая туда связи сознания с вниманием (хотя делали это иначе, чем я). К примеру: C. Montemayor and H. H. Haladjian, Consciousness, Attention, and Conscious Attention (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015); R. Ornstein, Evolution of Consciousness: The Origins of the Way We Think (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).
O. Sakarya, K. A. Armstrong, M. Adamska, M. Adamski, I. F. Wang, B. Tidor, B. M. Degnan, T. H. Oakley, and K. S. Kosik, “A Post-Synaptic Scaffold at the Origin of the Animal Kingdom,” PLoS One 2 (2007): e506.
Z. Yin, M. Zhu, E. H. Davidson, D. J. Bottjer, F. Zhao, and P. Tafforeau, “Sponge Grade Body Fossil with Cellular Resolution Dating 60 Myr before the Cambrian,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 112 (2015): E1453–60.
D. H. Erwin, M. Laflamme, S. M. Tweedt, E. A. Sperling, D. Pisani, and K. J. Peterson, “The Cambrian Conundrum: Early Divergence and Later Ecological Success in the Early History of Animals,” Science 334 (2011): 1091–7; A. C. Marques and A. G. Collins, “Cladistic Analysis of Medusozoa and Cnidarian Evolution,” Invertebrate Biology 123 (2004): 23–42.
H. R. Bode, S. Heimfeld, O. Koizumi, C. L. Littlefield, and M. S. Yaross, “Maintenance and Regeneration of the Nerve Net in Hydra,” American Zoology 28 (1988): 1053–63.
R. B. Barlow Jr. and A. J. Fraioli, “Inhibition in the Limulus Lateral Eye in Situ,” Journal of General Physiology 71 (1978): 699–720.
K. Hadeler, “On the Theory of Lateral Inhibition,” Kybernetik 14 (1974): 161–5.
S. Koenemann and R. Jenner, Crustacea and Arthropod Relationships (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2005).
B. Schoenemann, H. Pärnaste, and E. N. K. Clarkson, “Structure and Function of a Compound Eye, More Than Half a Billion Years Old,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 114 (2017): 13489–94.
R. Gillette and J. W. Brown, “The Sea Slug, Pleurobranchaea californica: A Signpost Species in the Evolution of Complex Nervous Systems and Behavior,” Integrative and Comparative Biology 55 (2015): 1058–69.
C. R. Smarandache-Wellmann, “Arthropod Neurons and Nervous System,” Current Biology 26 (2016): R960–R965.
S. Koenig, R. Wolf, and M. Heisenberg, “Visual Attention in Flies – Dopamine in the Mushroom Bodies Mediates the After-Effect of Cueing,” PLoS One 11 (2016): e0161412; B. van Swinderen, “Attention in Drosophila,” International Review of Neurobiology 99 (2011): 51–85.
D. H. Erwin, M. Laflamme, S. M. Tweedt, E. A. Sperling, D. Pisani, and K. J. Peterson, “The Cambrian Conundrum: Early Divergence and Later Ecological Success in the Early History of Animals,” Science 334 (211): 1091–97; B. Runnegar and J. Pojeta Jr., “Molluscan Phylogeny: The Paleontological Viewpoint,” Science 186 (1974): 311–17.
J. Kluessendorf and P. Doyle, “Pohlsepia mazonensis, an Early ‘Octopus’ from the Carboniferous of Illinois, USA,” Palaeontology 43 (2000): 919–26; A. R. Tanner, D. Fuchs, I. E. Winkelmann, M. T. Gilbert, M. S. Pankey, A. M. Ribeiro, K. M. Kocot, K. M. Halanych, T. H. Oakley, R. R. da Fonseca, D. Pisani, and J. Vinther, “Molecular Clocks Indicate Turnover and Diversification of Modern Coleoid Cephalopods during the Mesozoic Marine Revolution,” Proceedings of Royal Society, B, Biological Sciences 284 (2017): 20162818.
P. Godfrey-Smith, Other Minds: The Octopus, the Sea, and the Deep Origins of Consciousness (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016); S. Montgomery, The Soul of an Octopus (New York: Atria Books, 2015).
A.-S. Darmaillacq, L. Dickel, and J. A. Mather, Cephalopod Cognition (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014); D. B. Edelman, B. J. Baars, and A. K. Seth, “Identifying Hallmarks of Consciousness in Non-Mammalian Species,” Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2015): 169–87; J. N. Richter, B. Hochner, and M. J. Kuba, “Pull or Push? Octopuses Solve a Puzzle Problem,” PLoS One 11 (2016): e0152048.
B. Hochner, “An Embodied View of Octopus Neurobiology,” Current Biology 22 (2012): R887–92.
P. M. Merikle, D. Smilek, and J. D. Eastwood, “Perception without Awareness: Perspectives from Cognitive Psychology,” Cognition 79 (2001): 115–34; R. Szczepanowski and L. Pessoa, “Fear Perception: Can Objective and Subjective Awareness Measures Be Dissociated?” Journal of Vision 10 (2007): 1–17.
E. Knudsen and J. S. Schwartz, “The Optic Tectum, a Structure Evolved for Stimulus Selection,” in Evolution of Nervous Systems, ed. J. Kaas (San Diego: Academic Press, 2017), 387–408; C. Maximino, “Evolutionary Changes in the Complexity of the Tectum of Nontetrapods: A Cladistic Approach,” PLoS One 3 (2008): e3582.
D. Ingle, “Visuomotor Functions of the Frog Optic Tectum,” Brain, Behavior, and Evolution 3 (1970): 57–71.
Здесь авторская неточность. Роджер Сперри проводил подобные эксперименты в начале 1940-х гг. Работа 1943 г., на которую ссылается автор в Примечаниях, посвящена исследованию зрения тритонов без регенерации нерва. Упомянутый выше эксперимент был описан в работе 1944 г. “Optic nerve regeneration with return of vision in anurans”, опубликованной в Journal of neurophysiology. Полное библиографическое описание статьи см. в Примечаниях на с. 224. – Прим. науч. ред.
R. W. Sperry, “Effect of 180 Degree Rotation of the Retinal Field on Visuomotor Coordination,” Journal of Experimental Zoology Part A: Ecological and Integrative Physiology 92 (1943): 263–79; R. W. Sperry, “Optic nerve regeneration with return of vision in anurans,” Journal of neurophysiology 7.1 (1944): 57–69 (дополнение науч. ред.).
C. Comer and P. Grobstein, “Organization of Sensory Inputs to the Midbrain of the Frog, Rana pipiens,” Journal of Comparative Physiology 142 (1981): 161–68.
B. E. Stein and M. A. Meredith, The Merging of the Senses (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).
C. Comer and P. Grobstein, “Organization of Sensory Inputs to the Midbrain of the Frog, Rana pipiens,” Journal of Comparative Physiology 142 (1981): 161–68; D. Ingle, “Visuomotor Functions of the Frog Optic Tectum,” Brain, Behavior, and Evolution 3 (1970): 57–71.
B. E. Stein and M. A. Meredith, The Merging of the Senses (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).
T. Finkenstadt and J.-P. Ewert, “Visual Pattern Discrimination through Interactions of Neural Networks: A Combined Electrical Brain Stimulation, Brain Lesion, and Extracellular Recording Study in Salamandra salamandra,” Journal of Comparative Physiology 153 (1983): 99–110.
B. E. Stein and N. S. Gaither, “Sensory Representation in Reptilian Optic Tectum: Some Comparisons with Mammals,” Journal of Comparative Neurology 202 (1981): 69–87.
H. Vanegas and H. Ito, “Morphological Aspects of the Teleostean Visual System: A Review,” Brain Research 287 (1983): 117–37.
P. H. Hartline, L. Kass, and M. S. Loop, “Merging of Modalities in the Optic Tectum: Infrared and Visual Integration in Rattlesnakes,” Science 199 (1978): 1225–29.
S. P. Mysore and E. I. Knudsen, “The Role of a Midbrain Network in Competitive Stimulus Selection,” Current Opinion in Neurobiology 21 (2011): 653–60.
R. H. Wurtz and J. E. Albano, “Visual-Motor Function of the Primate Superior Colliculus,” Annual Review of Neuroscience 3 (1980): 189–226.
M. I. Posner, “Orienting of Attention,” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 32 (1980): 3–25.
E. F. Camacho and C. Bordons Alba, Model Predictive Control (New York: Springer, 2004); R. C. Conant and W. R. Ashby, “Every Good Regulator of a System Must Be a Model of That System,” International Journal of Systems Science 1 (1970): 89–97; B. A. Francis and W. M. Wonham, “The Internal Model Principle of Control Theory,” Automatica 12 (1976): 457–65.
M. S. A. Graziano and M. M. Botvinick, “How the Brain Represents the Body: Insights from Neurophysiology and Psychology,” in Common Mechanisms in Perception and Action: Attention and Performance XIX, ed. W. Prinz and B. Hommel (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), 136–57; N. Holmes and C. Spence, “The Body Schema and the Multisensory Representation (s) of Personal Space,” Cognitive Processing 5 (2004): 94–105; F. de Vignemont, Mind the Body: An Exploration of Bodily Self-Awareness (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018).
H. Head and G. Holmes, “Sensory Disturbances from Cerebral Lesions,” Brain 34 (1911): 102–254; G. Vallar and R. Ronchi, “Somatoparaphrenia: A Body Delusion. A Review of the Neuropsychological Literature,” Experimental Brain Research 192 (2009): 533–51.
A. M. Haith and J. W. Krakauer, “Model-Based and Model-Free Mechanisms of Human Motor Learning,” in Progress in Motor Control: Neural Computational and Dynamic Approaches, Volume 782, ed. M. Richardson, M. Riley, and K. Shockley (New York: Springer, 2013), 1–21; S. M. McDougle, K. M. Bond, and J. A. Taylor, “Explicit and Implicit Processes Constitute the Fast and Slow Processes of Sensorimotor Learning,” Journal of Neuroscience 35 (2015): 9568–79; R. Shadmehr and F. A. Mussa-Ivaldi, “Adaptive Representation of Dynamics during Learning of a Motor Task,” Journal of Neuroscience 14 (1994): 3208–24.